

*Roman I. Ismailov*

*candidate of military sciences, lecturer of the Academy of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Uzbekistan*

## CONTENTS OF COMBAT TRAINING OF TROOPS AT THE PRESENT STAGE

**Abstract:** This article presents the content of combat training of troops in modern conditions. The problems influencing its implementation are described.

**Key words:** combat training, officers, factors.

Combat training is a planned, organized and systematically conducted process of military training and education of personnel, combat coordination of crews (crews), units of military units and formations, command and control bodies (headquarters) under a single leadership to perform combat and other tasks in accordance with their purpose. Its purpose is to achieve a sufficient level of training of personnel, coordination of crews (crews), units, military units, formations and their command and control bodies, ensuring the unconditional fulfillment of the tasks assigned to them. At one time, J. Barlotta said that "the quality of combat training of troops is a matter of life and death for an individual soldier. For a nation, this means victory or defeat in war." In modern conditions, the relevance of this thesis is undeniable.

Recently it has become fashionable to justify the lack of planned combat training by solving the growing urgent tasks of everyday activities, excessive employment of commanders and staffs. The rich experience of training troops during the Second World War, as well as other armed conflicts of modern times, is not fully utilized and implemented.

We forget that even during the Second World War, during the preparation and implementation of combat coordination of units in the troops of the fronts, the duration of the training day was increased, the intensity of training was increased, and individual training was combined with the coordination of units as a whole. The main method of training personnel was established as a clear and visual demonstration, accompanied by a brief explanation of the methods of using weapons and combat equipment directly on the battlefield. Individual combat mentoring became widespread.

As Marshal of the Soviet Union K.A. Meretskov noted, "...the bitter experience of November 1941 taught us a lot. Even then we made it a rule: no matter how great the need for troops, incoming reinforcements and newly arriving units should be sent through training centers before battles or directly in the units to familiarize them with the peculiarities of conducting combat operations."

By decision of the State Defense Committee at that time, reserve and training units and formations, tank camps, artillery centers with training according to an accelerated combat training program were created. Marching companies were formed, which were invariably checked by special commissions before being sent to the active army.

The highest form of troop training was tactical exercises. On the eve of the Belorussian operation, for example, in the 334th rifle division of the 43rd army, 35 battalion tactical exercises were conducted from June 10 to 14, 1944, including 8 with forcing water obstacles and 9 with live fire [1].

The importance that was attached to fire damage during tactical exercises with live fire can be judged by the fact that the 5th Guards Army spent almost half of its army ammunition on exercises with live fire during the preparation for the Sandomierz-Silesian Operation. And this fully justified itself in battle.

During the war, considerable attention was paid to the training of commanders and staffs. Analysis of past battles and operations was widely practiced. If the situation allowed, war games, staff training and exercises were conducted. Thus, in May 1943, a two-day command and staff war game on the topic of "Counterattack of a tank brigade in cooperation with other branches of the armed forces" was held in the 1st Tank Army under the leadership of the Army Commander, Lieutenant General of Tank Troops M.E. Katukov, and in June, already under the leadership of the Front Commander, Army General N.F. Vatutin - "Introduction of a tank unit into a breakthrough" [2].

One of the ways to improve the quality of combat training of troops during the Second World War was to improve the training material and technical base, which included divisional and regimental training tactical fields, shooting ranges, and battalion assault towns. They were equipped at a distance of 5-8 km from the front line by subdivisions using captured equipment and locally available materials. Technical training aids were introduced into combat training: mobile engineering training classes, simple simulators for training tank and artillery crews, specialized towns and classes [3].

The experience of combat training of active army troops and accelerated training of mobilized contingents in reserve and reserve units and training centers has fully justified itself and has not lost its value and instructiveness to this day.

The diversity of conditions for the use of troops (forces) in armed conflicts and wars of the future obliges us to prepare the armed forces to solve diverse tasks. Unfortunately, the experience of using troops in armed conflicts of the last decades has once again convinced us that we do not learn the necessary lessons, and the reason for failures, large losses in personnel and equipment, as a rule, is the lack of planned combat training. We often begin to seriously prepare troops already in the course of combat operations, based on newly acquired experience. And we have to pay for this.

The history of wars clearly shows that in achieving victory, along with other constantly acting factors, the level of preparedness of troops and the quality of their combat training played a decisive role. This position not only remains valid today, but is becoming even more relevant in connection with the reforms taking place in many armies of the world.

In modern conditions, combat training of the Ground Forces is one of the most important components of the training of the Armed Forces [4]. It must be organized and carried out continuously both in peacetime and in wartime. When this is carried out continuously, taking into account military-political and operational-tactical conditions, success in armed struggle is guaranteed. And vice versa, where such activities are not carried out or are carried out episodically (as needed), the armed forces and states as a whole suffer defeat.

In short, the importance of combat training is growing. The tasks of organizing and conducting it follow from changes in the purpose of formations and units, the staffing and manning levels, the manning of a number of units of the district by contract servicemen, as well as the orientation of troop training primarily on qualitative parameters. All this requires a new approach to organizing combat training.

A high level of combat training is achieved by commanders (chiefs) knowing the actual state of troop training, timely and specific setting of tasks, high-quality and targeted planning of combat training activities, continuous, flexible and prompt management of combat training, personal participation of commanders in planning combat training activities and training subordinates.

At the same time, there are a number of problems characterized, first of all, by the content of socio-political, economic, military-technical and ideological factors that influence the training of troops.

The first problem is that modern combat conditions require systematic changes and improvements to the system of combat training of troops. Officers, due to certain objective and subjective reasons, do not have the necessary practical skills and theoretical knowledge. Many commanders do not have the ability to organize combat training, do not know how and what to teach subordinates, headquarters, military units and subdivisions. Shortcomings in the training of officers inevitably entail difficulties in the training of privates and sergeants, those who, in fact, determine success on the battlefield [5].

The second problem is financial and logistical support for combat training activities.

Financing for combat training often leaves much to be desired, and insufficient funds are allocated for its full implementation. This forces us to look for low-cost forms and methods of training, which generally affects the results of combat training, and causes a tendency to reduce the practical skills of commanders and staffs in organizing combined arms combat.

The third problem is caused by the low level of work of combat training management bodies, commanders and headquarters in planning inter-service training activities at the tactical level of command.

Inter-service training is the training of units, military units and formations of various services and branches of the Armed Forces, coordinated in tasks, place and time. Its purpose is to ensure combined arms training of troops, to practice methods of joint action in performing various tasks in the interests of and under the leadership of a combined arms commander, to prepare for participation in armed conflicts, peacekeeping operations and security as part of joint groups[6].

Fourth - the interaction of combined arms formations and military units with formations and military units of the branches of the Armed Forces, branches of the armed forces and other troops, military formations and bodies is not fully organized.

An army that does not keep pace with the development of military theory, is captive to outdated stereotypes, and is unable to correctly predict new phenomena and draw practical conclusions from them, is doomed to defeat.

At all times and in any army, the subjective factor has been decisive in organizing combat training - this is the will and initiative of commanders. One of the main subjective reasons for the low level of combat training at the present stage is that many commanders are comfortable: they hid behind the screen of objective reasons (underfunding, a bad soldier, officer, etc.) and can do nothing.

And our task is to draw the right conclusions from the analysis of combat training, troop training, and turn to face the main task for which we are all intended - the defense of the Fatherland.

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